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Abstract 
Older Americans have experienced dramatic gains in life expectancy in recent decades, but an 
emerging literature reveals that these gains are accumulating mostly to those at the top of the 
income distribution.  We explore how growing inequality in life expectancy affects lifetime 
benefits from Social Security, Medicare, and other programs and how this phenomenon interacts 
with possible program reforms.  We first project that life expectancy at age 50 for males in the 
two highest income quintiles will rise by 7 to 8 years between the 1930 and 1960 birth cohorts, 
but that the two lowest income quintiles will experience little to no increase over that time 
period.  This divergence in life expectancy will cause the gap between average lifetime program 
benefits received by men in the highest and lowest quintiles to widen by $130,000 over this 
period.  Finally we simulate the effect of Social Security reforms such as raising the normal 
retirement age and changing the benefit formula to see whether they mitigate or enhance the 
reduced progressivity resulting from the widening gap in life expectancy. 
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People with higher socioeconomic status have historically enjoyed longer life 
expectancies than those with lower socioeconomic status.  While this phenomenon has been 
documented since the 1970s (Kitagawa and Hauser, 1973), researchers have only recently begun 
to explore how the gap in life expectancy by socioeconomic status is evolving over time.  
Although there are some inherent challenges in this work, the emerging consensus of this 
nascent literature is that the gap is wide and has been increasing over time (Waldron, 2007; 
Bound et al, 2014).  Recent well-publicized studies by Case and Deaton (2015) and Chetty et al 
(2016) have helped to bring this issue to the attention of the general public. 
While the widening gap in life expectancy in the US is increasingly well documented, 
its impact on government programs such as Social Security and Medicare has received far less 
attention.  Yet the implications for these programs are potentially quite substantial.  These 
programs provide benefits annually from the age of initial benefit claim, which occurs between 
ages 62 and 70 for Social Security retired worker benefits and at age 65 (or earlier, in the case 
of disability) for Medicare, until death.  When life expectancy increases for those at the top of 
the income distribution, they collect additional years of benefits.  There is little corresponding 
increase in taxes paid, except to the extent that having a longer life expectancy may induce 
people to work longer.  By contrast, if those at the bottom of the income distribution are not 
experiencing a similar increase in life expectancy, there is no increase in their total lifetime 
benefits.  Thus the widening gap in life expectancy has the potential to greatly affect the 
lifetime progressivity of entitlement programs as well as their long-term solvency. 
A recent National Academies panel on which we participated explored the growing gap 
in life expectancy by socioeconomic status and its implications for government entitlement 
programs (Committee on the Long-Run Macroeconomic Effects of the Aging U.S. Population, 
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2015; hereafter, the Committee).  In this paper, we build upon the Committee’s work and 
expand on the implications of its findings for the US and other countries facing widening 
inequality in life expectancy.   
Our analysis proceeds in three steps.  First, we project how life expectancy at older ages 
is evolving over time by socioeconomic status.  We use lifetime income quintile as our core 
measure of socioeconomic status and estimate sex-specific mortality models that allow for 
differential trends by income quintile, using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) 
linked to Social Security earnings histories.  From these models, we project survival after age 50 
for the 1930 and 1960 cohorts, by income quintile and sex.  Next, we estimate the present value 
of lifetime benefits by cohort, income quintile, and sex.  We include benefits from Social 
Security, Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid and look 
at benefits, benefits net of taxes, and net benefits as a share of lifetime wealth.  These 
projections are based on the Future Elderly Model (FEM), a demographic and economic 
simulation model that uses data from the HRS and other sources and has been employed to 
project trends in health care outcomes and costs in studies such as Goldman et al (2005).  
Finally, we use the FEM to estimate the effect of potential reforms to Social Security and 
Medicare.  In each case, we simulate the reform’s effect on lifetime benefits and discuss how 
this compares to and interacts with the changes in benefit progressivity that are occurring due to 
changing life expectancy by income quintile. 
Our paper offers a number of contributions relative to the previous literature.  First, we 
summarize the complex methodological issues involved in projecting life expectancy by 
socioeconomic status and provide new estimates to complement those in other studies.  Second, 
we assess the progressivity of government programs and how this is changing over time due to 
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the widening gap in life expectancy by socioeconomic status.  While there are studies that 
explore the progressivity of individual programs such as Social Security or Medicare (e.g., 
Liebman, 2002; Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla, 2006), this is the first study of which we are 
aware that estimates the progressivity of all key programs in a single analysis and thus can 
assess the progressivity of government programs for the elderly as a whole.  Moreover, the 
previous literature has tended to look at progressivity at a point in time, rather than how it 
evolves over time with a widening gap in life expectancy, which is the primary focus of this 
study.  Finally, there are relatively few studies that focus on the distributional effects of 
possible reforms to Social Security or other government programs (Gustman and Steinmeier, 
2014 and Coronado et al, 2002 are examples), and those few do not focus on how this might be 
changing over time with the growing gap in life expectancy.   
We have several major findings.  First, consistent with other recent studies, we confirm 
that life expectancy at older ages has been rising fastest for the highest socioeconomic 
groups. For those born in 1930, the gap in life expectancy at age 50 between male workers in 
the bottom 20 percent and top 20 percent of lifetime earnings is 5 years, according to our 
estimates.  For males born 30 years later (in 1960), the projected gap at age 50 between high 
and low earners widens to almost 13 years, an increase of nearly 8 years.  Results for women 
appear to be even more pronounced, although we consider them to be somewhat less reliable.  
Second, we find that there is a growing gap by lifetime income in projected lifetime benefits 
from programs such as Social Security and Medicare.  For the 1930 cohort, the present value of 
lifetime benefits at age 50 is roughly equal for those in the highest and lowest quintile of 
lifetime income, as those at the top receive more from Social Security while those at the bottom 
receive more from Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, and Medicaid.  For the 
	 4	
1960 cohort, by contrast, there is a $130,000 gap in benefits between the highest and lowest 
quintiles, as high earners are increasingly likely to receive benefits over longer periods of time, 
relative to lower earners.  Finally, we show that there are a number of Social Security reforms 
that would make the program more progressive, although their impact on progressivity tends to 
be small compared to the changes arising due to differential changes in life expectancy. 
 
I. Background on Socioeconomic Status and Mortality  
For the US, research on differences in mortality by socioeconomic status (SES) has a 
long history, including the landmark study by Kitagawa and Hauser (1973) that found important 
differences in 1969 mortality by educational attainment. Differences in the mortality of African 
Americans and Whites also have been documented throughout the 20th century, with a gap of 7.1 
years in 1993. That gap has declined since then, to 3.4 years in 2014. Given this, one might have 
expected that SES differences had narrowed in general, but the opposite is the case. Study after 
study has found that SES differences have been widening in recent decades, whether SES is 
measured by educational attainment or by income. Before reviewing these studies, we will 
briefly consider some of the methodological difficulties in this area.  
Methodological Issues 
One of the biggest problems is reverse causality: while differences in SES may lead to 
differences in health and survival through various routes, it is also true that differences in health 
may lead to differences in income by affecting the ability of adults to work, by incurring out of 
pocket health care costs, and perhaps by affecting the educational attainment of children early in 
life and thereby earnings throughout life (Smith, 2004, 2007). Education-based measures of SES 
are at less risk in this regard than income based measures, because unlike income, education is 
largely fixed early in life. For our purposes here, reverse causality is not necessarily an issue, 
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because if ill health causes both lower income and shorter life the consequence is nonetheless 
that the lower income person in question receives government old age benefits over fewer years. 
The one possibility that we do need to exclude is that a short-term illness causes both a short-
term decline in income and a higher risk of death, because this association of short term changes 
will exaggerate the implications for receipt of government benefits over the longer term. Use of a 
long-term measure of income, as will be discussed later, greatly reduces this problem, 
particularly if it describes incomes earlier in life relative to the survival outcome.  
When the analysis period spans many years, there is a different problem: the meaning of 
an inflation adjusted dollar of income changes over time, and relative position in the income 
distribution of each year or generation may be a more meaningful measure. For this reason, the 
standard approach has been to use income quantiles rather than absolute income, as the SES 
measure.  
While measuring SES by educational attainment reduces the problem of reverse 
causality, it brings a new problem: increasing adverse selection for those in low attainment 
categories such as less than high school graduation, as the general level of attainment in the 
population rises. Increasing adverse selection at lower attainment levels, and decreasing positive 
selection for the higher attainment levels, make it difficult to interpret changes over time, and 
could, for example, lead to estimates of declining life expectancy for the lower attainment groups 
(Dowd and Hamoudi, 2014). One way to avoid this problem is to define attainment by percentile 
position in the educational distribution for each birth cohort.  
The use of quantile measures for education or income helps to avoid some problems, but 
it also has a drawback. A positive finding still leaves us not knowing whether a widening 
dispersion in income or earnings is causing a widening dispersion in mortality by SES.  
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Recent Literature on Education and Mortality 
 Many studies in the past eight years have reported life expectancy differences by 
educational attainment that are both strikingly wide and increasing. Meara et al (2008) compare 
remaining life expectancy at age 25 for men (denoted e25) with at least some college to that of 
men with high school or less in 2000. For African American men, the difference was 8.4 years 
and for White men it was 7.8 years, and in both cases the differences had increased by 1 or 2 
years since 1990. Rostron et al (2010) compared e45 for the highest and lowest education 
category in the early 2000s, finding a difference of 10-12 years for females and 11-16 years for 
males. Olshansky et al (2012) found that life expectancy at birth for white women with less than 
high school education actually declined by 4 or 5 years from 1990 to 2008. This study also found 
that e0 for men with more than 16 years of education was 13.4 years more than those with less 
than high school in 1990, rising to 14.2 years by 2008, with an increase for women from 7.7 to 
10.3 years. None of these studies addressed the problem of increasing adverse selection. Bound 
et al (2014) address this issue by analyzing education quartiles for 1990 and 2010. With this 
approach they find no decline in life expectancy for low education women, but they do find a 
difference of 6-7 years in the median age at death in 2010 between the bottom quartile of males 
and the top three quartiles, and this difference had roughly doubled since 1990. Hendi (2015) 
also explicitly addresses the selection problem using different methods. This study finds a 
difference in e25 between less than high school and college of about ten years for both White men 
and women, and finds that the difference is growing. It also finds that e25 declined for least-
educated White women, with only some of the measured decline accounted for by selection. A 
study by Goldring et al (2015) reported no evidence that mortality declines were numerically 
greater for high education men than for low, but they did not consider whether proportional 
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declines may have been greater for them, so it is not clear whether their findings are inconsistent 
with the other studies. Case and Deaton (2015) found a significant increase between 1999 and 
2013 in all-cause mortality of middle-aged non-Hispanic men and women, with more dramatic 
increases for those with less education and for whites. They suggest a potential connection with 
the opioid epidemic and more broadly with economic distress.  Overall, the findings of the 
studies using educational measures are very consistent in showing very large and widening 
differences.  
 
Recent Literature on Income and Mortality 
 A seminal study by Waldron (2007) based on mortality and earnings data from Social 
Security and Medicare engendered a wave of closely related studies using a similar design based 
on the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) linked to Social Security earnings histories. 
Waldron measured income as the average of non-zero Social Security earnings at ages 45 to 55. 
It was not possible to use full lifetime earnings because many workers joined Social Security 
later in their careers when coverage was expanding. For those reporting zero earnings in a year, it 
was not possible to distinguish between those with no earnings and those whose earnings were 
not covered by Social Security. Waldron related quantiles of this earnings measure to mortality 
observed in later years in the age range 60 to 89 in the years 1972 to 2001, with ages depending 
on the birth cohort.1 She projected future mortality for each birth cohort in order to get a measure 
of e65. A striking chart shows that for the birth cohort of 1913, there was only a half-year 
difference in e65 between the top half of the earnings distribution and the bottom half. For the 
cohort born 28 years later in 1941, however, this difference had grown to 4.6 years, and while e65 
																																								 																				
1 Fewer and fewer years are observed for the more recent cohorts, ending in only one year for the 1941 birth cohort. 
2 The discussion in this section in large part reflects the contributions of Committee member David N. Weil. 
3	A workers whose NRA is 67 receives 70% of the PIA if he claims at age 62 and 124% of the PIA if he claims at 
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for the bottom half of the earnings distribution rose by only a bit over one year, for the top half it 
rose by about 6 years.  
 While Social Security data covers a huge population and has rich earnings histories, it 
also has very few covariates. Bosworth and Burke (2014), building on Waldron’s studies, chose 
to use the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). Its sample is relatively small, but it is linked to 
the Social Security earnings histories and it has exceptionally rich information on health, 
disability, assets, pensions, and many other variables of potential interest. Bosworth and Burke 
measure income as quantiles of the average of non-zero earnings for ages 41-50, and relate this 
to mortality above age 50. For couples, they allocate to each the sum of their individual incomes 
divided by the square root of two, to adjust for economies of scale in household consumption. A 
later study by Bosworth, Burtless and Zhang (2016) uses a similar design but analyzes data from 
both HRS (through the 2012 wave) and SIPP (Survey of Income and Program Participation). The 
results are quite similar to Waldron. There is a difference in e50 between the highest and the 
lowest earnings decile of 9 to 12 years for males and females born in 1940, a big increase 
relative to the difference for the birth cohort of 1920.  
Chetty et al. (2016) use tax data to study the gradient in life expectancy in different 
geographies. The results suggest not only a growing gradient by income, but that the 
magnitude of the gradient is smaller in more affluent, more educated areas than in less 
affluent, less educated ones.   
One recent exception to the growing body of literature showing expanded life 
expectancy gaps is Currie and Schwandt (2016), who find that low-income counties have 
narrowed the gap in life expectancy at birth (but not at age 50) with high-income countries. 
An important research agenda involves reconciling the results for children  with those for 
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adults, including by examining differences in childhood mortality at the individual rather than 
county level.   In general, however, the literature points to substantial increases in life 
expectancy differentials for adults. 
 
II. Background on the Progressivity of Government Programs 
Conceptual Issues 
 The growing gap in life expectancy by SES forces society to grapple with a key question 
– is it “fair” for groups that experience larger gains in life expectancy to receive larger gains in 
the present value of government benefits?2  For most government programs, policy makers do 
not focus on lifetime benefits because there is no obvious time dimension: in any given year, 
people who are alive pay taxes and receive benefits such as national defense and clean air.  But 
for programs where the ages at which taxes are paid and benefits received differ significantly, 
this issue becomes critical.  For brevity, we discuss this issue in terms of Social Security only, 
although similar arguments may apply to Medicare and other programs. 
 With Social Security, two concepts dominate discussions regarding fairness.  The first is 
the expected rate of return on payroll tax contributions.  In a system with an actuarially fair rate 
of return, the present value of real benefits received is equal to the present value of real 
contributions.  In the US, early cohorts received more than fair average rates of return due to the 
transfers inherent in starting a pay-as-you-go system; current and future cohorts receive less than 
fair returns because of the costs of these transfers (Leimer, 1995).  Of greater relevance here is 
whether the average rates of return for different SES groups within a cohort are similar.  Similar 
rates of return across groups may align with basic notions of fairness, enhance political support 
for the system, and minimize work disincentives.  As the gap in life expectancy grows, the 
																																								 																				
2 The discussion in this section in large part reflects the contributions of Committee member David N. Weil. 
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average rate of return for the high SES group increases because longer life does not much 
increase tax payments by members of the group but it does raise their years of benefits.  If 
societal notions of fairness dictate that all groups should receive an equal rate of return, then the 
effects of the growing gap in life expectancy on the distribution of lifetime benefits are 
undesirable.  
 The second key consideration for society is the extent to which Social Security should 
redistribute from those with high lifetime earnings to those with low lifetime earnings.  Any such 
action naturally tends to make the rates of return unequal across groups, but may nonetheless be 
desired by society, motivated by a utilitarian concern for the poorest members of society.  While 
the growing gap in life expectancy does not reduce the absolute benefits received by low-SES 
groups (unless their life expectancy is declining), it does render the system relatively less 
generous to such groups; moreover, it may threaten absolute benefits of low-SES groups by 
straining the program’s finances.  In practice, the US system seems to embrace both the rate of 
return framing of Social Security (by referring to payroll taxes as contributions and tracking each 
worker’s contributions over his or her life) and its redistributive role (by employing a progressive 
benefit formula, as discussed below). 
 Another salient feature of Social Security is that it is an annuity.  Such a system 
necessarily redistributes from the short-lived to the long-lived, generating ex post inequality in 
the rate of return.  This may be contrasted with the ex ante inequality that would arise, for 
example, if one group paid more in taxes but received the same benefit amount as another.   Ex 
post inequality does not offend notions of fairness because it is unpredictable – some 60-year-
olds live a long time, some do not – and the fact that the system provides larger lifetime benefits 
to those who live longer is what it is designed to do, in order to insure against the risk of having a 
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long life and many years of consumption to finance.  This may become problematic, however, if 
there are identifiable groups that vary in life expectancy, as this introduces a non-random aspect 
to the inequality.  Moreoever, since ex post inequality penalizes those with short lives and they 
are disproportionately low earners, it undermines the progressivity of Social Security that is 
embedded in the benefits formula.   
 
Background on Government Programs 
 While a discussion of the institutional features of all government programs for the elderly 
is impractical, we provide a few details that are most salient for the programs’ distributional 
impact.  We focus on Social Security, since most reform proposals we later consider concern it. 
 Individuals are eligible for Social Security if they have 40 quarters of covered earnings.  
To calculate benefits, past earnings are multiplied by a wage index and an average of the top 35 
years of indexed earnings is calculated (Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, or AIME).  A 
piecewise linear formula is applied to the AIME to create the Primary Insurance Amount (PIA), 
the basis for the monthly benefit.  The formula introduces progressivity because the rate at which 
AIME is translated into PIA declines as AIME increases.  In 2016, each dollar of AIME up to the 
first bend point of $856 is converted into 90 cents of PIA; the conversion factor is 32 percent 
until the next bend point of $5,157 and 15 percent for earnings beyond this value.   
The monthly benefit depends on the age at initial benefit claim. Workers may claim as 
early as 62, the Early Eligibility Age (EEA), and as late as 70.  Workers receive the PIA if they 
claim at the Normal Retirement Age (NRA), which has been rising over time from age 65 (for 
those born by 1937) to 67 (for those born in or after 1960). Workers face an actuarial reduction 
(increase) for claiming before (after) the NRA, designed to ensure that the expected benefits 
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received over a worker’s lifetime are roughly the same regardless of claiming age.3 4  Dependent 
and surviving spouses and children of insured workers are eligible for benefits; individuals who 
are dually entitled receive the larger of the benefits to which they are entitled.   
The Disability Insurance (DI) program is integrated with Social Security and its benefit is 
similar, except there is no reduction for early claiming; eligibility requires passing a medical 
screening and meeting recent work requirements.  When DI recipients reach the NRA, they move 
to Social Security. Social Security and DI benefits are funded by payroll taxes of 6.2 percent of 
earnings by both employers and employees, up to a taxable maximum of $118,500 in 2016.  The 
Supplemental Security (SSI) program provides cash benefits to low-income individuals who are 
age 65 and up, or who are blind or disabled.  Benefits are $733 for a single person and $1,100 for 
a couple but are reduced dollar-for-dollar against other benefits and income.      
Medicare is available at age 65.  Individuals are eligible if they or a spouse has worked 
40 quarters.  Medicare includes hospital insurance (part A) as well as optional supplemental 
insurance that pays for physician services and prescription drugs (parts B, C, and D).  Part A is 
financed by payroll taxes on earnings, while other parts are financed by premiums and (mostly) 
general revenues.   Medicaid provides health insurance to low-income individuals; it is the 
primary payer of long-term care services, which are not generally covered by Medicare. 
 
Recent Literature on Progressivity 
																																								 																				
3	A workers whose NRA is 67 receives 70% of the PIA if he claims at age 62 and 124% of the PIA if he claims at 
age 70. Whether the reduction factor is, in fact, actuarially fair for a typical worker is a matter of some dispute.  
Shoven and Slavov (2013) argue that the gains from delaying Social Security have increased dramatically since the 
1990s due to a combination of low interest rates, increasing longevity, and legislated increases in the gain for 
claiming delays beyond the NRA (the “Delayed Retirement Credit”).   
 
4 A further complication in the benefit calculation is the Social Security earnings test.  Before the NRA, workers 
face a reduction in benefits if they earn above an exempt amount ($15,720 in 2016).  However, upon reaching the 
NRA, the worker is credited for any lost months of benefits through a recomputation of the actuarial adjustment.  
Although there is some evidence the earnings test may affect claiming behavior (Gruber and Orszag, 2003), it does 
not affect the (ex ante) progressivity of Social Security, and so we abstract from it in our discussion. 
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 Estimating the progressivity of Social Security and other programs raises new challenges, 
starting with how to measure it.  One option is to compare the replacement rate (ratio of benefits 
to average earnings) at different points in the income distribution.5  The OASDI Trustees (2013) 
find the replacement rate for a worker is 42% for an average-wage worker, 56% for a low-wage 
worker, and 35% for a high-wage worker.  Naturally, the benefit amount rises with past earnings, 
even though the replacement rate falls.  By this measure, Social Security is highly progressive. 
The replacement rate excludes contributions, however, yielding an incomplete picture of 
progressivity.6  Some alternatives that address this (Geanakoplos et al, 1999) include the internal 
rate of return (rate at which an individual must be willing to trade off between present and future 
income in order for the present value of benefits and taxes to be equal), benefit/tax ratio (ratio of 
these present values, calculated at the market rate of discount), and the net transfer (difference of 
these present values).  As before, one can compare these measures at different points in the 
income distribution.  Liebman (2002) finds that the IRR is much higher for low-income workers.   
The results from any analysis of progressivity depend, to some extent, on decisions the 
researcher must make in order to carry out the calculations, including the earnings measure used 
to determine an individual’s place in the income distribution.  Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) 
and Coronado et. al (2011) find that the progressivity of Social Security is reduced or eliminated 
when using lifetime rather than annual earnings, household rather than individual earnings, and 
potential (with full-time work at the current hourly wage) rather than actual earnings.7   
																																								 																				
5	While it is typical to use career earnings, some use final earnings or an average of earnings in the years just before 
retirement; Goss et. al. (2014) compare replacement rates using alternative earnings measures.		
6	Economic theory suggests that the incidence of employer contributions to Social Security may fall on workers, in 
the form of reduced wages; evidence from Gruber (1997) supports this hypothesis, and virtually all analysts adopt 
this convention in their calculations.  
 
7	These changes reduce progressivity because there may be people who have low earnings by the initial earnings 
measure and receive high net transfers who would be reclassified as higher earners under the new definition, such as 
a part-time worker (higher potential than actual earnings) or non-working spouse (higher household than individual 
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Another factor that is of particular interest here is differential mortality.  As discussed 
earlier, large and growing differences in mortality by SES are expected to reduce progressivity.  
Liebman (2002) shows that when using mortality probabilities that vary only by age and sex, low 
SES groups gain more from Social Security than do high SES groups; however, when race- and 
education-specific mortality tables are used, the progressive effect of the non-linear benefit 
formula is largely undone, due to the shorter life expectancy of low-SES groups. 
Turning to other programs, DI benefits are even more progressive than Social Security 
because low-income workers are more likely to go on DI.  A CBO analysis (2006) finds much of 
the progressivity of the overall OASDI system is due to DI benefits.  Analyses of Medicare 
progressivity come to differing conclusions – Bhattacharya and Lakdawalla (2006) find that 
Medicare Part A expenditures are much larger for the less educated, while McClellan and 
Skinner (2006) find total Medicare expenditures to be roughly similar by zip code income level.  
Medicaid expenditures are unsurprisingly skewed towards low-SES groups, though De Nardi et 
al (2013) find that use of Medicaid by high-income groups rises markedly with age, as 
individuals spend down their assets and become eligible. 
 
III. Empirical Methods 
We now turn to discussing our own projections of the gap in life expectancy by SES and 
the progressivity of Social Security and other government programs.  In the work of the 
Committee (2015) that we discuss here, estimates follow the approach of Bosworth and Burke, 
using waves of the HRS from 1992 to 2008, covering cohorts born 1912 to 1957 (with different 
years of coverage by cohort), and calculating mid-career earnings averaged over ages 41 to50, 
with zeros replaced by imputations based on regressions. Earnings above the taxable cap were 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
earnings).  Progressivity also falls when including earnings above the taxable maximum or using a higher discount 
rate (Fullerton and Mast, 2005) or using only workers who survive to age 62 in the analysis (CBO, 2006).	
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estimated based on the month in which the cap was reached.  Incomes for individual members of 
couples were assigned incomes equal to the sum of their individual incomes divided by the 
square root of 2. Quintiles of mid-life income were assigned separately for males and females. 
We analyzed quintiles of mid-life income (which we also refer to as lifetime income) in relation 
to mortality by age and sex for ages 50 and above, as the data coverage permitted.  
We estimated probit equations for each sex, with a linear time trend to capture the general 
improvement of health and mortality, the earnings quintile, and a quintile specific time trend to 
capture changes in mortality dispersion. We did not include other available covariates such as 
education or race/ethnicity, because to do so would work at cross-purposes of the goal of our 
study. For our purposes it does not matter whether such variables are associated with differences 
in health and mortality, as they surely are; even if these associations accounted for all the 
difference in mortality, it would still be true that lower income people have shorter lives and 
receive government benefits for fewer years in old age. For similar reasons we do not include 
biomarkers or measures of health status as covariates.  We carried out a number of robustness 
and sensitivity checks with alternative model specifications.  
For our analysis of progressivity, we make use of the Future Elderly Model (FEM), a 
demographic and economic simulation model designed to predict the future costs and health of 
the elderly and to estimate how this could be affected by health trends or policy reforms.8  The 
FEM begins with a cohort of Americans at age 50 drawn from the HRS data.  Each individual in 
the cohort has a measure of lifetime income (measured as described above) and an initial health 
status.  The FEM features models that relate characteristics like age, income, and health status to 
the probability of transitioning into various health and financial states, including retirement, 
																																								 																				
8	More details about the FEM model and these calculations are available at www.nap.edu/GrowingGap under the 
resources tab.	
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Social Security claiming, DI claiming, disease, and death.  These models are inherently 
associative rather than causal, although exogenous variation that occurs during the sample period 
can help to identify model parameters – for example, individuals in the HRS face different 
NRAs, which helps to identify the effect of being exactly at versus younger than the NRA on the 
probability of transitioning to Social Security receipt.  While the HRS (1992-2008 waves) is the 
primary data source for the FEM, information from the 2002-2004 Medicare Current Beneficiary 
Survey (MCBS) and 2002-2004 Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) is used for 
estimating health expenditures.  The estimates from the transition models are combined with 
individual characteristics to estimate the probability that individuals will transition across the 
various health and financial states over a two-year period.  Using updated characteristics, the 
model predicts transitions over the next period, and this process is repeated until everyone in the 
cohort has died.  
The baseline scenario is based on the initial health status distribution of the 1930 cohort 
and its estimated mortality gradient.  We then modify the initial health status distribution and 
mortality gradient to that of the (simulated/projected) 1960 cohort and contrast the new results to 
baseline.   Health status does not enter directly into mortality or medical spending, so these 
outcomes are driven entirely by the mortality gradient.  Health does influence some economic 
outcomes, so the differences in initial health prevalence will lead to some cohort differences in 
trajectories after age 50 in earnings, labor force participation, and claiming of Social Security, 
DI, and SSI, although the two cohorts have the same earnings up to age 50 by construction.  We 
also use the 2010 policy environment for both calculations, to isolate the effect of changing 
mortality gradient alone.  As a final step, we modify the policy environment and simulate new 
results to contrast to the baseline, in order to show the effect of the reforms on lifetime benefits. 
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We report our results in terms of three related outcome measures: the present value of 
benefits at age 50 (expected benefits received after age 50 discounted back to that age using a 
real rate of 2.9 percent), the present value of net benefits (same but net of all taxes paid after age 
50), and the present value of net benefits as a share of inclusive wealth (net benefits relative to a 
measure that includes asset holdings at age 50, after-tax earnings after age 50, and net benefits 
after age 50, all in present value at age 50).  We measure benefits received and taxes paid after 
age 50, as opposed to on a full lifetime basis, because the FEM starts with a cohort of 50-year-
olds drawn from the HRS.  Our measure of benefits should be quite similar to a lifetime measure, 
since most benefits from Social Security, Medicare, and the other programs are received after 
age 50, although our net benefit measure will overstate the extent of net transfers from the 
government because it excludes taxes paid before age 50.  However, the focus of our study is on 
the change in gross and net benefits resulting from mortality changes after age 50, which is 
unaffected by the exclusion of taxes earlier in life.   
 
IV. Results 
Mortality Projections 
Later we will report the results of simulation experiments that isolate the effect of the 
widening mortality dispersion on the lifetime value of government benefits received after age 50. 
These simulations contrast these values under the mortality regimes of the birth cohort of 1930 
and 1960. For this reason we will present our results for these two birth cohorts. However, it is 
important to keep in mind that we do not actually observe even one year of deaths at age 50 or 
above for the 1960 birth cohort, because it turns age 50 in 2010 and the latest wave of the HRS 
that we use is 2008. Thus the mortality results for this birth cohort are slightly out-of-sample 
estimates based on the fitted model. For the 1930 birth cohort, turning 50 in 1980, we have 
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observations from age 62 in 1992 to age 78 in 2008. To estimate e50 we must extrapolate 
mortality to older ages until the cohort has died out, and this we do by assuming that the trends 
estimated in the model continue, including the quintile divergence. The trends and projections 
for overall life expectancy arrived at in this way are quite similar to those in the Social Security 
Administration projections, which were also used by Waldron (2007) for this purpose. But 
because those Social Security projections assume some deceleration of mortality decline as time 
passes, the Committee projections of e50 are slightly higher.  
The Committee estimates of remaining life expectancy at age 50 by sex and income 
quintile are shown in Figure 1. Life expectancy at 50 is a convenient summary measure, but for 
our simulations we of course used the survival probabilities to each age, which are not shown 
here. For the male birth cohort of 1930, e50 is lowest for the bottom quintile and rises steadily as 
we move to higher quintiles, reaching a level 5.1 years higher for the top quintile. For the 1960 
male birth cohort the lowest quintile has slightly lower e50 than the 1930 cohort, but then rises to 
a level 12.7 years higher for the top quintile, indicating a very large increase in the dispersion.  
For females, the results are a bit more erratic, and this appears to be the case in other 
studies as well, such as Waldron (2007) and Bosworth and Burke (2014). For the female birth 
cohort of 1930, e50 is fairly flat across the first three or four quintiles, and then rises for the fifth 
quintile which is 3.9 years higher than the first. For the 1960 cohort, e50 is 4.0 years lower for the 
bottom quintile than for the 1930 cohort, a striking decline. Thereafter it rises steadily but slowly 
to the fourth quintile, with levels very similar to those for the 1930 cohort, showing no gain at all 
between the cohorts. Only for the top quintile has e50 risen substantially, and it achieves a level 
13.6 years higher than the bottom cohort. These estimates for females should be treated with 
caution.  
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There are, of course, many sources of uncertainty in our estimates of mortality 
differences by income quintile, and even more so in the growth in these differences between the 
cohorts of 1930 and 1960. While we were not able to assess this uncertainty formally, we did 
also prepare mortality projections for the 1960 cohort on the assumption that the dispersion 
increased only half as rapidly as in our baseline projection shown in Figure 1. We also carried 
out simulation experiments based on these alternative projections.  
 
Progressivity of Lifetime Benefits 
 Next, we discuss our findings with respect to the progressivity of lifetime benefits from 
government programs, contrasting the experience under the mortality conditions of the 1930 and 
1960 cohorts.  Recall that this exercise is not meant to obtain a projection of actual benefits for 
these two cohorts, but rather to isolate the effect of the changing mortality gradient and initial 
health distribution on lifetime benefits.  In our simulation experiments the policy environment 
and earnings up to age 50 are the same for both cohorts, though the actual two birth cohorts had 
different experiences. 
 We begin with Social Security, reporting results in Figure 2a.  For males in the 1930 
cohort, benefits rise with earnings quintile – workers in the lowest quintile can expect to receive, 
on average, $126,000 of benefits over the rest of their lives (discounted to age 50), while workers 
in the top quintile can expect to receive $229,000, or 82% more than the lowest income workers. 
The fact that higher earners receive higher benefits is not surprising, since the monthly benefit 
amount rises with AIME, albeit in a non-linear fashion.  As these benefit values are not scaled by 
earnings (as with a replacement rate measure) and do not include taxes (as with money’s worth 
measures), we cannot directly infer the progressivity of Social Security from these estimates. 
More interesting for our purposes is how the results change when we move from the 
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mortality regime of the 1930 cohort to that of the 1960 cohort. The additional 6-8 years of life 
expectancy for the top three quintiles leads to large increases in expected Social Security 
benefits, with benefits for the top quintile in 1960 reaching $295,000.  The difference between 
the highest and lowest quintiles is $173,000, or 142% of the lowest income worker’s benefit.  
These results suggest that Social Security is becoming significantly less progressive over time 
due to the widening gap in life expectancy.9    
The results for women, as shown in Figure 2b, also show benefits rising with earnings 
quintile in the 1930 cohort, with expected benefits of $112,000 for women in the lowest quintile 
and $208,000 for women in the top quintile.  Benefits here are any received by the individual, 
including dependent spouse and survivor benefits derived from the earnings record of the spouse.  
Due to their lower career earnings and benefit entitlements, women’s total expected benefits are 
about 90% as large as those for men, though they can expect to live 4-5 years longer.  As for 
men, the gap between the top and bottom of the distribution is large and widening over time – 
this difference is 86% of the bottom quintile’s benefits for the 1930 cohort but jumps to 158% 
for the 1960 cohort.  These changes are larger than those for men because the model predicts a 
decline in life expectancy for lower income women over time, but the overall message is the 
same – diverging life expectancy is making Social Security less progressive over time. 
Expected DI benefits (Figures 3a and 3b) are smaller than expected Social Security 
benefits because the probability of ever receiving DI is far lower.  While Social Security benefits 
rise with earnings quintile, DI benefits decline sharply – for males with the mortality regime of 
the 1930 cohort, benefits are $25,000 for the lowest quintile, $11,000 for the middle quintile and 
$4,000 for top quintile.  While a low-AIME worker on DI receives a smaller benefit than a high-
																																								 																				
9	These figures refer to gross benefits; we discuss benefits net of taxes below.  
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AIME worker on DI, the low-AIME worker is so much more likely to receive DI that his 
expected DI benefit is larger.  The pattern for women is the same but the values are less than half 
as large, due to their lower career earnings and lower probability of ever going on DI.  Unlike 
Social Security, expected DI benefits are stable across cohorts, since increases in life expectancy 
are concentrated in the third through fifth quintiles, which have relatively low probabilities of DI 
claiming.10  Thus the progressivity of DI benefits is unchanged over time.  
SSI benefits (Figures 4a and 4b) are also larger for the lower quintiles because of a higher 
probability of receipt.  For men in the 1930 cohort, expected benefits are $11,000 in the lowest 
quintile, $4,000 in the second, and negligible for the others.  Values are about twice as large for 
women, because of their longer life expectancy and higher probability of ending up with the low 
income necessarily to qualify for SSI.  Here too changes across cohorts are small. 
 Moving to health care benefits, we first note that those with lower lifetime income have 
higher annual Medicare expenditures.  For example, for 67-year-old males, Medicare 
expenditures in the lowest income quintile are 48 percent higher than in the top quintile; for 
females at this age, the increase is 69 percent.  This ratio attenuates somewhat with age, likely 
because the least healthy people in the bottom quintile die earlier.    
In terms of lifetime Medicare benefits (Figures 5a and 5b), for men in the health and 
mortality regime of the 1930 cohort, benefits are relatively flat by earnings quintile.  Males in the 
lowest quintile can expect to receive $162,000 in lifetime benefits, only 6 percent more than 
those in the top quintile, as the higher annual Medicare expenditures of the lower income group 
is roughly offset by their shorter life expectancy.  But widening disparities change this picture 
considerably for the regime of the 1960 cohort of males, where those in the bottom quintile can 
																																								 																				
10	In results not shown here, the FEM model predicts that the probability of claiming DI over a two-year period for 
the 1930 cohort peaks around age 62 at nearly 20% for Q1 males, versus roughly 10% for Q2 and Q3 males and 5% 
or less for Q4 and Q5 males; predicted claiming behavior for later cohorts is similar.  	
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expect to receive just 78 percent of the lifetime benefits for those in the top quintile.  For the 
regime of the 1930 cohort of females, those in the lowest income quintile receive about 30 
percent more in lifetime Medicare benefits than those in the top, due to the steeper income 
gradient in annual spending for women.  But as with males, the distribution of benefits is 
changing over time.  For the regime of the 1960 cohort, lifetime Medicare benefits for females in 
the lowest income quintile are only 92 percent of the benefits in the top quintile.   
Medicaid benefits (Figures 6a and 6b) are highly skewed towards those with low lifetime 
earnings.  For the regime of males in the 1930 cohort, the present value of Medicaid from age 50 
on is $77,000 for those in the lowest earning quintile, $35,000 in the second, and just $16,000 for 
those in the highest quintile.  For females – who are much more likely to use nursing homes – the 
disparities are even larger: the average lifetime Medicaid benefit from age 50 is $164,000 in the 
lowest quintile but only $21,000 in the highest quintile.  Widening disparities in life expectancy 
over time have little effect on Medicaid benefits for men (as for DI and SSI), but diminish the 
gap between benefits for high and low income women as a result of our (somewhat less reliable) 
estimates of falling life expectancy for women at the bottom of the income distribution.  
Finally, we calculate the present value of total benefits from Social Security, Disability 
Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and Medicaid (Table 1). For the regime of 
males in the 1930 cohort, the present value of gross total benefits is about $400,000 in both the 
bottom and top quintiles, with somewhat lower benefits for the middle quintiles.  This pattern 
reflects the fact that high-income workers receive larger benefits from Social Security, while 
low-income workers receive more from DI, SSI, and Medicaid.  Moving to the regime of the 
1960 cohort, gross benefits for males in the top quintile are $132,000 higher than those for males 
in the bottom quintile.  This is due to the larger Social Security and Medicare benefits received 
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by high-income males under this regime.  
When looking at net rather than gross benefits (Table 2), benefit levels are naturally 
lower.  However, the effect of moving to the 1960 regime is nearly identical.  While higher 
earners pay more in taxes than lower earners, the pattern is not markedly different between the 
mortality regimes of the 1930 and 1960 cohorts.  To summarize, our key finding is that changing 
the mortality and health regime from that of the 1930 to the 1960 cohort causes the gap between 
average lifetime benefits received by men in the highest and lowest quintiles to widen by about 
$130,000.  The change arises from the impact of mortality on benefits and not on taxes. 
For the regime of the 1930 cohort females, the top quintile has lower average lifetime 
benefits levels than those at the bottom, largely because Medicaid benefits, which deliver larger 
benefits to those towards the bottom of the earnings distribution, are a larger factor in the total 
for females than for males.  The difference is even larger when looking at net benefits.  Of chief 
interest, however, is how this changes with the mortality regime.  In the earlier regime, women in 
bottom quintile received $129,000 more in gross benefits than those in top quintile.  For the 
regime of the 1960 cohort, women in the top quintile receive $28,000 more, reflecting a shift of 
$157,000 in their favor.  While we consider the mortality projections for women to be somewhat 
less reliable for men, the main point that changing mortality leads benefits to accrue increasingly 
to women at the top of the income distribution nonetheless seems sound.  
We also estimate the effect of the changing mortality gradient on net lifetime benefits as 
a fraction of inclusive wealth.  We find that the share of wealth accruing from net benefits rises 
by 7 percentage points for the top quintile of male earners when we contrast the 1930 to 1960 
mortality regime, but falls slightly for the lowest quintile.  For females, the share rises by 5.4 
percentage points for the top earners and falls by 3.6 percentage points for the bottom earners.  
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As a result, whatever the baseline pattern of progressivity, the overall progressivity of lifetime 
benefits as defined by this measure declines markedly for both males and females.  To put it 
another way, the switch to the 1960 mortality regime increases the fraction of wealth represented 
by entitlement benefits by 5 to 7 percent for top earners, and reduces these resources by 0 to 4 
percent for the lowest earners. 
Two observations about these findings are noteworthy.  First, the preceding discussion 
focused mostly on the top versus the bottom quintile.  But the comparison for males applies also 
to roughly the top half of the income distribution relative to the bottom half.  Second, the 
increased gaps in the present value of net benefits are driven primarily by Social Security (where 
the absolute level of present value dollars for top earners is projected to rise significantly relative 
to bottom earners) and Medicare (where the program is projected to move from being roughly 
neutral with respect to lifetime earnings to one in which the present value of benefits for higher-
earning males is much larger than for lower earners). 
 
Policy Reform Simulations 
 Our final goal is to analyze policy reforms to determine how they would affect the 
progressivity of government programs and interact with projected changes in life expectancy.  
The reforms we simulate – five that affect Social Security and one that affects Medicare – were 
chosen because they are either frequently mentioned in policy discussions or meet objectives 
with which many stakeholders would agree.  Unfortunately, the structure of the FEM made it 
impossible to simulate certain reforms, such as raising the Social Security maximum taxable 
earnings amount.  The policy simulations we study include: raising the Social Security EEA by 2 
years (to age 64), raising the Social Security NRA by 3 years (to age 70); reducing the cost-of-
living adjustment applied to benefits by 0.2 percent per year; reducing the top PIA factor by one-
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third (from a 15% to 10% rate); reducing the top PIA factor to 0 above median AIME; and 
raising the Medicare eligibility age by 2 years (to age 67).    
 There are two mechanisms by which a policy change may translate into change in 
benefits.  The first, which can be characterized as the “mechanical effect,” results directly from 
the policy change, holding behavior constant.  For example, if the NRA were raised by 3 years, a 
worker claiming benefits at age 67 would see the monthly benefit amount fall from 100 percent 
of the PIA to 80 percent, experiencing a 20 percent reduction in benefits.  The second channel, 
which can be characterized as the “behavioral effect,” results from changes in individual 
behavior in response to the policy.  For example, the individual may claim Social Security later, 
work longer, or be more likely to claim DI.  These responses can be captured by the FEM.    
 We show results for all reforms on Table 4, for brevity reporting only the change in net 
benefits as a fraction of inclusive wealth for the 1960 mortality regime resulting from the reform; 
we discuss results for males only in the text, though the table includes values for females also.  
We begin with the increase in the EEA.  At first glance, it might seem that this policy would 
have little effect on the present value of benefits given the common belief that the actuarial 
adjustment is roughly actuarially fair.  We find that this reform raises net benefits as a share of 
wealth by 0.1 for males in the lowest quintile under the 1960 mortality regime and by 0.4 for 
males in the highest quintile.  Under our assumptions, the actuarial adjustment for delayed 
claiming is slightly more than fair, so when individuals are forced to claim later by this policy 
change, lifetime benefits increase, particularly for high-income individuals who have longer life 
expectancies.  The policy change is thus mildly regressive, although its effects are fairly small.   
 Raising the NRA has a much bigger effect – we estimate that lifetime Social Security 
benefits fall by $30,000 (or 25% of the pre-reform value) for the lowest quintile of males in the 
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1960 mortality regime and by $59,000 (20%) for the highest quintile.  The percentage drop need 
not be the same in the two quintiles because the behavioral response of the two groups to the 
policy change (captured by the FEM) could differ; also, the same response – say, postponing 
retirement and claiming by one year – could have a different effect on lifetime benefits because 
of differences in life expectancy.  As low income males experience the larger percentage drop in 
benefits, this policy might be considered regressive.  Yet the policy change reduces benefits as a 
share of wealth by 4.8 percent for males in the lowest quintile and by 5.2 percent for males in the 
highest quintile, as the larger dollar loss for high income males ends up being a slightly larger 
share of their lifetime wealth (as captured by our inclusive wealth measure).  Viewed by this 
metric, the policy change is progressive.  Thus, the progressivity of this policy change is 
somewhat sensitive to the particular measure used. 
 Reducing the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) has a modest effect on benefits, reducing 
them by 0.4 percent of wealth for males in the lowest quintile under the 1960 mortality regime 
and by 0.6 percent for males in the highest quintile.  The larger effect for high income men is due 
to their longer life expectancy, since the effect of a lower COLA is cumulative over time.  
Reducing the top PIA factor by one-third has a fairly modest impact of 0.1 percent of wealth for 
low-income males and 0.3 percent for high-income males; the larger effect on high-income 
males is expected, since the top PIA factor applies only to earnings past the second bend point of 
AIME (e.g., at higher earning levels).  A related policy with a much bigger impact is reducing 
the top factor to zero and moving the second bendpoint to the median of AIME.  This policy, 
which would reduce benefits for the top half of earners, is chosen an as example of a substantial 
benefit cut designed to have a smaller impact on low earners.  We find that this policy would 
reduce benefits as a share of wealth by 1.1 percent for males in the lowest quintile and by 3.4 
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percent for men in the highest quintile.  Finally, we simulate raising the Medicare eligibility age.  
This policy has a fairly similar effect across quintiles in dollar terms, reducing lifetime Medicare 
benefits by $8,000 for low-income males in the 1960 mortality regime and by $7,000 for high-
income males.  Measured as a share of inclusive wealth, there is a loss of 1.4 percent for low-
income males and 0.5 percent for high-income males, indicating a regressive policy. 
 Overall, most of these policy changes would make overall net benefits more progressive.  
The exceptions are raising the EEA or the Medicare eligibility age, which make benefits less 
progressive.  When compared to the changes in progressivity occurring due to mortality trends, 
however, the effect of these policies on progressivity is generally fairly small.  For example, 
consider the policy reducing the top PIA factor to zero above median AIME, which is the most 
progressive of the policies we simulated.  Absent any policy change, the gap in lifetime Social 
Security benefits between males in the highest and lowest income quintiles grows from $103,000 
in the 1930 mortality regime to $173,000 in the 1960 mortality regime.  Implementing this policy 
would eliminate 60 percent of the increase, so that the gap under the 1960 regime would be 
$131,000.  This illustrates the scale of the policy reform that would be needed to counteract the 
changes in progressivity of government benefit programs that we project are occurring due to the 
widening gap in life expectancy.  
 
V. Discussion  
Life expectancy at older ages has been growing steadily in the U.S. over the past 
several decades.  Yet there is growing awareness that these gains are not being shared equally.  
Our study confirms a substantial increase in the life expectancy gap between higher and lower 
earners.  For men, we project that the gap in life expectancy at age 50 between males in the 
highest and lowest quintiles of lifetime earnings will grow from 5 years for the 1930 cohort to 
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nearly 13 years for the 1960 cohort.  Estimates for women, while somewhat less reliable, show 
a similar if not larger change over time.  
We also assess the effects of the growing gap in life expectancies among older adults 
on the major entitlement programs.  The larger life expectancy gap means that higher-income 
people will increasingly collect retirement benefits over more years than will lower-income 
people. We estimate the value of net lifetime benefits for different income groups from 
Social Security, Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income, Medicare, and 
Medicaid.  Our estimates suggest that these net lifetime benefits are becoming significantly 
less progressive over time because of the disproportionate life expectancy gains among higher-
earning adults.  The changes in life expectancy between the 1930 and 1960 mortality regimes 
generate an increase in benefits equivalent to an increase of 6.9 percent of wealth (measured at 
age 50) for men in the highest income quintile, while benefits for men in the lowest income 
quintile are essentially unchanged.  Women in the top income quintile gain 5.4 percent of 
wealth, while those in the bottom quintile receive lower benefits, according to our estimates. 
We then consider how the differential changes in mortality would affect analyses of 
some possible reforms to government programs for the elderly in the face of population 
aging. For example, many proposals to increase the normal retirement age under Social 
Security are motivated by the rise in mean life expectancy.  The mean, however, masks 
substantial differences in mortality changes across earnings categories.  We show the 
impact of that proposal and other possible Social Security and Medicare refoms on lifetime 
benefits across the earnings categories and in a manner that reflects their different life 
expectancy trajectories. We find that while there are policy reforms that tend to raise the 
progressivity of government programs, the effect of these reforms are fairly small when 
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viewed next to the reduction in progressivity that is occurring due to the growing gap in life 
expectancy.  This suggests that policy changes that (alone or in combination) are more 
progressive than those we simulate here would be needed to undo the effect of the 
widening longevity gap on the progressivity of government programs. 
Social Security, Medicare, and the other programs included in our study face 
rising expenditures over time, straining the aibility of existing revenue sources to fully 
fund benefit promises at current tax rate.  The US is far from unique in this regard – 
rising longevity, falling birth rates, and slowing economic growth threaten the long-term 
solvency of entitlement programs in many countries, particularly where financed via a 
pay-as-you-go mechanism or out of general revenues.  Many countries have already 
implemented reforms to public pension,  disability insurance, and other social insurance 
programs, for example by raising retirement ages or altering benefit formulas in a way 
that reduces program generosity, and many countries continue to comtemplate 
implementing additional reforms.  As policy makers continue to face these difficult 
choices, it may be useful for them to take into account the important implications of the 
increasing gap in life expectancy. 
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Figure 1: Life expectancy at age 50, actual and projected, for birth cohorts of 1930 and 
1960, by income quintile 
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Figure 2: Average lifetime Social Security benefits by lifetime income quintile, 1930 vs. 
1960 mortality regime (in thousands of dollars) 
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Figure 3: Average lifetime Disability Insurance benefits by lifetime income quintile, 1930 
vs. 1960 mortality regime (in thousands of dollars) 
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Figure 4: Average lifetime Supplemental Security Income benefits by lifetime income 
quintile, 1930 vs. 1960 mortality regime (in thousands of dollars) 
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Figure 5: Average lifetime Medicare benefits by lifetime income quintile, 1930 vs. 1960 
mortality regime (in thousands of dollars) 
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Figure 6: Average lifetime Medicaid benefits by lifetime income quintile, 1930 vs. 1960 
mortality regime (in thousands of dollars) 
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Table 1: Present Value of Entitlement Program Benefits at Age 50, by Sex, for People 
Under the Mortality Regimes of the 1930 and 1960 Birth Cohorts
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Table 2: Present Value of Net Benefits (benefits received minus taxes paid after age 50) at 
Age 50, by Sex, for People Under the Mortality Regimes of the 1930 and 1960 Birth 
Cohorts
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Table 3: Present Value of Net Benefits as a Share of Present Value of Inclusive Wealth at 
Age 50, by Sex, for People Under the Mortality Regimes of the 1930 and 1960 Birth 
Cohorts
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Table 4: Impact of Policy Reforms on Net Benefits as a Share of Inclusive Wealth at Age 
50, by Sex, for People Under the Mortality Regimes of the 1960 Birth Cohorts 
Earnings	 Percentage	Point	Change	
Quintile	 Raise	 Raise	 Lower	 PIA	10%	 PIA	0%	 Raise	
	
EEA	 NRA	 COLA	 Rate	 Rate	from	 Medicare	
	 		 		 		 		 Median	 Age	
Males	
	 	 	 	 	 			Lowest	 0.1	 -4.8	 -0.4	 -0.1	 -1.1	 -1.4	
		2	 0.2	 -5.5	 -0.5	 -0.1	 -1.4	 -1.1	
		3	 0.5	 -5.7	 -0.6	 -0.1	 -2.1	 -0.8	
		4	 0.5	 -5.5	 -0.7	 -0.2	 -2.7	 -0.7	
		Highest	 0.4	 -5.2	 -0.6	 -0.3	 -3.4	 -0.5	
	 	 	 	 	 	 	Females	
	 	 	 	 	 			Lowest	 0.2	 -3.1	 -0.2	 0.0	 -0.3	 -1.5	
		2	 0.3	 -4.0	 -0.3	 0.0	 -0.5	 -1.5	
		3	 0.6	 -4.7	 -0.4	 -0.1	 -0.9	 -1.4	
		4	 0.6	 -4.9	 -0.4	 -0.1	 -1.1	 -1.2	
		Highest	 0.6	 -4.9	 -0.5	 -0.1	 -1.3	 -0.7	
 
 
 
